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Locating financial incentives among diverse motivations for long-term
private land conservation
Matthew J. Selinske 1,2, Benjamin Cooke 3, Nooshin Torabi 1, Mathew J. Hardy 1,2, Andrew T. Knight 2,4,5,6 and Sarah A. Bekessy 1,2
ABSTRACT. A variety of policy instruments are used to promote the conservation of biodiversity on private land. These instruments
are often employed in unison to encourage land stewardship beneficial for biodiversity across a broad range of program types, but
questions remain about which instruments are the appropriate tools when seeking long-term change to land-management practice.
Drawing on three case studies, two in Australia and one in South Africa, spanning various program types—a biodiverse carbon
planting scheme, a covenanting program, and a voluntary stewardship program—we investigate the importance of financial incentives
and other mechanisms from the landholder’s perspective. From participant interviews we find that landholders have preconceived
notions of stewardship ethics. Motivations to enroll into a private land conservation program are not necessarily what drives ongoing
participation, and continued delivery of multiple mechanisms will likely ensure long-term landholder engagement. Financial incentives
are beneficial in lowering uptake costs to landholders but building landholder capacity, management assistance, linking participants
to a network of conservation landholders, and recognition of conservation efforts may be more successful in fostering long-term
biodiversity stewardship. Furthermore, we argue that diverse, multiple instrument approaches are needed to provide the flexibility
required for dynamic, adaptive policy responses. We raise a number of key considerations for conservation organizations regarding
the appropriate mix of financial and nonfinancial components of their programs to address long-term conservation objectives.
Key Words: biodiversity; covenant; easement; farmer engagement; market-based instrument; policy mix; program design; reverse auction;
stewardship
INTRODUCTION
A primary aim of private land conservation (PLC) programs is
to motivate landholders toward preservation, active management,
restoration, and sustainable utilization of private lands to
support biodiversity and landscape conservation (Stern 2006).
Conserving biodiversity on private lands depends not only on
protection but also long-term management (Naidoo et al. 2006).
As such PLC programs must not only consider initial landholder
uptake but also how the program fosters and sustains landholder
stewardship through time (Greiner and Gregg 2011). Land
stewardship, which has been documented among rural
landholders for decades (Leopold 1949), is the set of ideas and
practices that landholders use to manage their properties for
long-term public and private benefits (Worrell and Appleby
2000), capturing the desire to conserve biodiversity as well as to
act as custodian of production landscapes (Gill et al. 2010).
Encapsulated within stewardship is the notion of legacy: an
aspiration to improve or maintain the condition of the land for
the benefit of future landholders. The long-term stewardship
motives of landholders align with a range of different
instruments for PLC, including management assistance,
permanent protection, recognition, social learning, and financial
incentives (Gunningham and Young 1997).  
The instruments supporting PLC are often used in conjunction,
providing different mechanisms to increase program
participation among landholders, while meeting multiple
objectives. Optimally, a mix of instruments will be implemented
by different organizations at multiple governance levels within
the same conservation and geographic space, acting in concert to
protect biodiversity on private lands (Young and Gunningham
1996). Because the social-ecological settings of private lands are
complex, programs must accommodate their inherent dynamism
by carefully selecting and employing a complementary mix of
instruments (Stirling 2010).  
Financial incentives compensate landholders for the costs
associated with land management or opportunity costs, reducing
impediments to program uptake (Pannell and Wilkinson 2009).
In a variety of economic contexts, the use of financial incentives
operates under the assumption that people will shift more readily
and effectively toward proenvironmental behavior when a fiscal
inducement is offered (Farrier 1995). However, while financial
incentives are at times instrumental to securing a PLC agreement
(Moon and Cocklin 2011) and short-term shifts in land
management have been documented (Kay et al. 2013), it remains
unclear what specific role financial incentives play in engendering
a long-term stewardship perspective, given the complex array of
nonfinancial motivations that constitute stewardship (Reimer et
al. 2012).  
Currently, financial incentives are applied in various ways to
promote proconservation land management. These include direct
and indirect payments or reimbursements, aimed at inducing
positive, or preventing negative, behavior (Pannell 2008).
Financial incentives are commonly used to remove perceived
barriers to landholder participation, leveraging conservation
action from individuals or communities lacking the interest or
financial means to conserve or restore their land (van Putten et
al. 2011, Race and Curtis 2013).  
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Table 1. Program attributes and study methods.
 
Greenfleet
Biodiverse carbon plantings
EcoTender Biodiversity Stewardship Program
Location Victoria, Australia Victoria, Australia Western Cape, South Africa
Landscape Rural Rural and peri-urban Rural and peri-urban
Program
Objectives
Encourage individuals and businesses to
offset carbon emissions;
Plant native trees that contribute to
biodiversity and carbon sequestration ;
Provide habitat for native wildlife and
enhance water quality, manage salinity, and
protect soils;
Supply trees and labor at no cost to
landowners;
To provide opportunities by which private
landholders are supported and rewarded as
the suppliers of public environmental
benefits;
To maximize the cost-efficiency of
government investment in ecological services
through a process of competitive bidding for
environmental management funding
between interested landholders;
To offer a financial incentive to participate
in environmental management practices as a
means for attracting a wider cross-section of
landholders than suasion/education-based
voluntary environmental management
programs;
To ensure that privately owned areas with
high biodiversity value receive secure
conservation status and are linked to a
network of other conservation areas in the
landscape.;
To ensure that landowners who commit their
property to a stewardship option will enjoy
tangible benefits for their conservation
actions.;
To expand biodiversity conservation by
encouraging commitment to, and
implementation of, good biodiversity
management practice on privately owned
land, in such a way that the private
landowner becomes an empowered decision
maker;
Land use Commercial, semicommercial, and lifestyle
farming
Rural-residential, lifestyle farming, bush
block for conservation
Commercial, semicommercial, lifestyle
farming, and rural residential
Program
characteristics
100 year contracts, no direct payments, trees
and labor paid for, trees will be replanted if
neccassary
Payments for ecosystem services and
permanent conservation covenant
Short-term (5–10 year) voluntary agreements
and long-term (30 years–in perpetuity) legally
binding contracts
Reduced land tax incentive
Partial reimbursement for management
Stewardship officer visits
Research
Methods
Qualitative
17 participants (37% of program total in
Victoria)
Semistructured interviews
Random sample of landholders Victoria
Qualitative
21 participants (~20% of program total)
Semistructured interviews
Random sample of landholders Victoria
Qualitative
75 participants (85% of program total)
Semistructured interviews and online/mailed
survey
Using insights from three PLC programs in Australia and South
Africa that represent different types of financial incentives, i.e.,
carbon offset, reverse auction, and rates rebates (Table 1), we
sought to explore how different types of financial incentives
interact with the diversity of landholder’s motivations to
participate in PLC and how they contribute to sustaining long-
term commitment to PLC. In our investigation we highlight three
key issues requiring critical attention if  financial incentives are to
be explicitly designed to improve PLC program effectiveness: (1)
engaging landholders’ existing notions of stewardship, (2)
applying financial incentives in a way that is attentive to securing
long-term benefits, and (3) decentering financial incentives as the
core mechanism in a broader mix of instruments. We then draw
from these insights to argue that uncritical use of financial
incentives risks disregarding the complexity of social-ecological
systems (Li and Li 2012) including the diversity of participant
motivations, expectations, and experiences (Moon and Cocklin
2011, Selinske et al. 2015). We also suggest that the positioning
of financial incentives as the dominant approach potentially
compromises the effectiveness of PLC programs, particularly
through their lack of capacity to respond to the complexity,
diversity, and dynamism of social-ecological systems (Muradian
et al. 2013).
Reviewing the challenges for implementing financial incentives
Financial incentives have proven to be an attractive proposition
for conservation organizations because they (a) increase
participation rates (Ernst and Wallace 2008); (b) allocate funding
in a quantifiable and verifiable way (Robins and Kanowski 2011);
and (c) have the potential to deliver immediate outcomes, e.g.,
prevention of vegetation clearing (Binney et al. 2010). The use of
financial incentives accords with the view that landholders should
be compensated for the lost opportunities to pursue land uses that
compromise nature, in their provision of ecological benefits for
the public good (Morrisette 2001). Perhaps most significantly, the
advertised benefits of financial incentives are frequently set
against the perceived failure or limitations of other approaches
to PLC, namely regulatory instruments and suasion efforts
(Cocklin et al. 2007, Whitten et al. 2013). In this sense, the rise of
financial incentives fits within a neoliberal framework for PLC
and environmental policy more generally (e.g., Robertson 2004,
Higgins et al. 2014).  
To date, the development and evolution of financial incentives
has centered on the “needs of the [funding] provider” (Sorice and
Donlan 2015:788), with particular emphasis on reducing the
implementation and transaction costs of PLC programs. This
approach risks utilizing financial incentives because of their
perceived alignment with existing governance structures or
mentalities, rather than their suitability to a specific on the ground
context (Higgins et al. 2012, Cooke and Moon 2015). Accounting
for context in program design is vital (Young et al. 1996); if
financial incentives are applied without careful consideration, it
is possible that the investment by conservation organizations in
fostering stewardship may be jeopardized.  
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Table 2. Case study questions.
 
EcoTender Greenfleet Biodiversity Stewardship Program
How did you come to decide that EcoTender
would fit with your conservation efforts?
What were your motivations for participation? Can you please list your reasons for entering the
biodiversity stewardship programme?
What do you see as the major benefits of the
EcoTender program?
How do you describe the benefits of participating
in Greenfleet?
How do you feel you benefit from being involved
in the biodiversity stewardship programme?
What is one aspect of the program you would
change if  you could that you think would have
enhanced your experience of it?
Are you satisfied with your current agreement
with Greenfleet?
Do you have any suggestions on how to improve
the biodiversity stewardship programme?
What activities do you think you
will continue when the program concludes?
How did you find managing/integrating new
plantings with your usual business?
What are your long-term goals for your land?
The fixed-term nature of some financial incentives highlights the
danger of a mismatch between the length of time the PLC
program runs and the time required to achieve on-ground
conservation outcomes. Financial incentives can fundamentally
change a landholder’s willingness to contribute to conservation
activities, arguably a main benefit for governments implementing
PLC programs (Rode et al. 2015). Direct payments can potentially
increase the cost of conservation over time as landholders come
to expect payments, seeing them as an entitlement, or creating
dependencies, leading to questions over what happens if  or when
the incentives cease (Elmendorf 2003). Organizations must also
account for both the immediate expenditure associated with
financial incentives and the subsequent uncertainty of their
investment for producing lasting biodiversity outcomes where
political, economic, and climatic conditions may change,
potentially compromising a program’s ecological, social, and/or
cost-effectiveness (Rissman 2011, Mendham et al. 2012).
Moreover, market-based instruments (MBI) and similar direct
financial incentives that prominently feature in the financial
aspect of the program may lack the dynamism required to cover
rising opportunity costs, the need for social learning and
knowledge sharing in a changeable social-ecological setting, or
guaranteed funding for the long timelines suitable to landscape
scale restoration and protection (Swart et al. 2003). In the face of
these issues, clear questions remain about whether financial
incentives are the appropriate tool when seeking long-term change
to land-management practice.
METHODS
Introduction to empirical case studies from Australia and South
Africa
To illustrate the complex social-ecological interactions around
PLC into which financial incentives are being introduced, we draw
from empirical research in Australia and South Africa. The
qualitative research that we engage with offers deep insights that
clearly expose the need for diverse approaches to PLC. Exploring
the detail and nuance of conservation efforts as they play out on
the ground through interviews and participant observation
provides a counterbalance to existing assumptions and
predictions for how financial incentives and other instruments
might operate.  
Each case is defined by the implementation of a financial incentive
program in a given geographical area. Case study research was
pursued in all three instances because it encourages an in-depth
exploration and analysis of phenomena in a real-life context
(Stake 1995). The commonality between cases in the way they are
defined makes a combined approach to analysis appropriate in
this instance. Additionally, questions asked by researchers of each
case study were similar in nature (Table 2). During a one-day
workshop we discussed each case study in detail identifying
similar objectives of the research and common themes discovered
in the results (George and Bennett 2005).  
A key limitation of our research is that it is based on three case
studies sharing similar private property rights characteristics,
which may constrain its applicability beyond similar contexts. We
are not seeking to generalize from our cases, but to provide
examples that illustrate the range and complexity of stewardship
motivations to which financial incentives must be attentive.
Case studies
Greenfleet
Greenfleet is a not-for-profit organization collaborating with
landholders to plant multiple species of native trees on private
lands throughout Australia to offset the greenhouse gas emissions
of businesses and individuals. Although landholders do not
receive direct financial incentives for participating, Greenfleet
agrees to cover the costs of restoration, with landholders then
obliged to manage the revegetated land for 100 years. Landholders
were recruited through a posted invitation facilitated by
Greenfleet. Interviews took place between January and
September 2013 with 17 private landholders. In-depth,
semistructured interviews were used to obtain comprehensive
data about peoples’ experiences, perceptions, and opinions.
Interviews took one to two hours and included walking or driving
around participants’ properties with them as the interview
progressed. This enabled the interviewers to gain a grounded
understanding of the landholder’s experiences with their carbon
plantings. The interview questions asked pertained to landholder
drivers to participate in a carbon offset, land management
challenges, and critiques of the program.  
Interviews were tape-recorded and transcribed verbatim. Data
analysis was informed by a thematic approach that helps to
discover and present the patterns found in the interviews (Braun
and Clarke 2006, Saldaña 2009). Interview materials were coded
line by line using an open coding technique in NVivo 10 qualitative
analysis software (QSR International 2012, http://www.
qsrinternational.com).
EcoTender
In this study, participants in the Victorian EcoTender Program
(from eastern Victoria) were interviewed on their properties.
EcoTender is a reverse auction tender program, run by the State
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of Victoria, requiring landholders to bid for funds to complete
agreed conservation works on their land. The conservation agency
then allocates funds to the bids that represent the best return on
investment. Once landholders are selected to participate, the
program contract runs for five years.  
Landholders were recruited by an e-mail sent to all landholders
in the case study region who had been successful with their
EcoTender bid. The e-mail contained a summary of the research
objectives and central research questions of interest (captured in
Table 2), with interested landholders contacting the researcher to
participate. Property visits took place in 2010 (seven interviews)
and 2016 (15 interviews) as part of an ongoing study of PLC
program participation in Victoria. In-depth, semistructured
interviews were held with landholders, followed by the interviewer
walking the participants’ property with them (in a similar manner
to the Greenfleet study). The intention of the interviewer was to
acknowledge that the landscape serves as a repository of memory
when people have a strong attachment to place, which allowed
participant perspectives on program participation to be linked
closely with on-ground activities (Strang 2010). Research
questions focused on how landholders’ environmental
management practices emerged and developed over time, and the
way PLC programs shaped, or were shaped by, landholder
conservation motivations and practice. Interviews and notes from
the property walks were transcribed and coded using an open
thematic coding approach, which groups together passages with
common ideas and perspectives to build a substantive thematic
structure around a shared idea (Saldaña 2009). The NVivo
software package was used to facilitate the coding. Emergent
themes were discussed in detail and presented to colleagues for
critical reflection and discussion as the research progressed.
Biodiversity Stewardship Program
Since 2003, South Africa has worked toward meeting national
protected area and critical biodiversity targets through the
Biodiversity Stewardship Program (BSP), a PLC initiative.
Although coordinated at the national level, the BSP is
implemented at the provincial level. This research, conducted over
nine months from July 2013 through to March 2014, assessed the
motivations of landholders participating in the Western Cape
province’s BSP, how these motivations and program
implementation generated satisfaction or dissatisfaction with the
program, and predicted the likelihood the landholder would
remain in the BSP after a contract ended. These three factors were
measured qualitatively through semistructured interviews and by
online or mailed surveys.  
CapeNature, the Western Cape’s parastatal conservation agency,
provided a list of all BSP landholders (88 households) who were
then contacted by e-mail or phone. Initially, all landholders were
sent an e-mail or a mailed survey (Dillman et al. 2009) of which
35 landholders responded. An additional 40 were interviewed in
person using the same protocol as the mailed surveys. On average,
interviews took one to two hours to complete. If  convenient for
the landholder, interviews took place while touring their land
enrolled in the BSP. Questions focused on the landholder’s
relationship with the land and the BSP, motivations to participate
in PLC, how the BSP could be improved, and land management
goals. Responses were coded based on themes identified by a
priori understanding of the program or those that emerged during
analysis (Kitchin and Tate 2000, Braun and Clarke 2006). Coding
themes centered on identifying landholder motivations to
participate in the BSP, satisfaction with the program, and
commitment to management objectives and remaining in the
program. Recurrent themes were identified and interrogated with
two coresearchers as part of the coding process. Additional
insights into the BSP based on quantitative methodology were
reported in Selinske et al. 2015.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
We synthesize the findings from our individual case studies,
including demographics (Table 3), and draw out three themes in
the data that relate to the use of financial incentives in PLC.
1. The need to engage with existing stewardship ethic
Although the reverse auction EcoTender program seeks to attract
landholders by offering payments for the delivery of ecosystem
services, some participants used the program as a means for
placing an in perpetuity conservation covenant on their land, a
motivation that aligns with legacy preservation that extends
beyond the duration of their own land tenure. For example, 38%
of the Victorian landholders surveyed submitted EcoTender bids
upon discovering the program offered a permanent protection
agreement. These landholders were previously unsuccessful in
securing a covenant through other conservation organizations,
having been told that their patches of mixed remnant and
revegetated forest were not considered of significant ecological
value. As a result, 20% of landholders who did not have existing
covenants deliberately placed a low bid to increase their likelihood
of getting the covenant, even though that meant the money they
received only covered between a third and half  of their land
management costs:  
Because [the restoration is] something I would have done
anyway but I think the real bait for me was the covenant.
If I did all this [work] and after I’ve gone somebody buys
the land and knocks it all over, what’s the point [of
restoration]? 
One landholder saw EcoTender as an alternative way to realize
an existing desire to protect the landscape from encroaching local
development. The attraction of the scheme was that it “had teeth”
in terms of regulatory controls that helped to see “all this [work]”
preserved. Although landholders implemented this program
creatively to align with their stewardship objectives, the hybridity
of the program, where multiple mechanisms are combined into
the one initiative, appealed to a diversity of landholder
stewardship aspirations (Gunningham and Young 1997).  
Another landholder was enthusiastic about the EcoTender
scheme for similar reasons: “I wanted to protect it into the future
for the environments who can’t protect themselves and for all the
many people who have come and helped [with the restoration
effort].” Here, the motivation was to protect restoration efforts
for their habitat value, but also because the vegetation embodied
the efforts of friends and neighbors who had assisted. Ensuring
a future owner could not undo these efforts was critical, suggesting
the importance on securing long-term conservation benefits as
part of landholders’ motivations. These sentiments are commonly
expressed by landholders who have sought out covenants or
easements to protect their land and/or conservation efforts
(Harrington et al. 2006, Lai and Kreuter 2012). These examples
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Table 3. Socio-demographics of program participants.
 
Age Term of
ownership
Majority of income generated from
property (productive land use) Livelihoods/land use
Green Fleet 25–39
40–54
55–69
70–99
18.0%
41.0%
29.0%
12.0%
< 5 years
5–20 years
> 20 years
12.0%
53.0%
35.0%
49% of participants generated
majority of income from property
Commercial/
semicommercial: 59.0%
Lifestyle/hobby farm: 41.0%
Biodiversity
Stewardship
Program
30–39
40–49
50–59
60–69
70–99
5.70%
17.1%
20.0%
40.0%
17.1%
< 5 years
5–20 years
> 20 years
2 or more
generations
6.30%
62.5%
12.5%
18.6%
46% of participants generated
majority of income from property
Commercial/
semicommercial: 63.0%
Lifestyle/hobby farm: 27.0%
EcoTender 30–39
40–49
50–59
60–69
70–79
10.0%
25.0%
35.0%
21.0%
10.0%
< 5 years
5–15 years
> 15 years
10.0%
69.0%
21.0%
24% of participants generated the
majority of their income from
property
Commercial/
semicommercial: 30.0%
Lifestyle/hobby farm: 70.0%
reveal that financial incentives were often secondary
considerations for landholders compared with other aspects of
the program, despite being the centerpiece of EcoTender program
design.  
The creative interpretation of incentive-based programs offers
insights into the complex, diverse, and unanticipated ways in
which an existing stewardship ethic can interact with a financial
incentive. Although landholders generally found ways to
accommodate their conservation motives, the EcoTender example
suggests that the financial incentives in question could focus more
intently on connecting with existing and ongoing landholder
stewardship efforts, rather than a finite policy intervention that
is detached from a social and ecological context. By doing more
to recognize existing stewardship, financial incentives can be
designed and implemented in ways that better accommodate
nonfinancial motives for conservation, rather than some
landholders having to co-opt programs to meet their needs.  
In the Greenfleet case study, land restoration was a strong driver
for landholders to consider participation in the scheme. Reflecting
a stewardship ethic, 89% of landholders were motivated by the
idea of restoring land to provide more suitable habitat for native
fauna. As one participant noted: “We just...wanted to rehabilitate
the land I suppose, so we wanted to bring back what would have
been here with the habitat to the local fauna.” Additionally,
landholders tended to take an eco-centric approach toward their
land: as one landholder expressed “So it’s just we kind of feel like
that we’re doing something for the health of the land and giving
something back instead of just taking stuff  away from it.”  
Similarly, with BSP participants, although a few landholders were
previously uninterested in conservation prior to learning about
the program, for many an existing stewardship ethic was already
in place. The protection of land in perpetuity was used to describe
45% of landholder’s motivations often in conjunction with
“safeguarding nature for future generations.” Others (22%)
discussed a moral obligation to protect nature or for one “divine
purpose.” Landholders in all three case studies expressed a belief
that they were part of the biotic community that exists on their
property, a view very much in line with Leopold’s stewardship
ethic (Leopold 1949). Moral aspects of caring for land through
stewardship can be powerful drivers of program participation,
irrespective of what the main objective and intention of the
program might be.
2. Securing participation and long-term collaboration
A challenge to PLC programs and their long-term effectiveness
is the interplay between different types of incentives and how they
work to retain landholders. Effective PLC programs cater for the
multiple, diverse motivations held by individuals and groups of
landholders across a landscape (Young et al. 1996, Knight et al.
2010, Armsworth et al. 2012). However, programs often must
continue to incentivize landholders postenrolment to ensure they
remain in a program, manage their property for biodiversity gains,
and comply with agreed management practices (Sorice et al.
2013). As in other environmental programming, this can be a
secondary consideration; once knowledge is gained, attitudes are
shifted, or adoption and uptake is in place, it is measured as an
output or outcome with little consideration toward longer term
impact (Wilson and Hart 2001).  
Research in conservation volunteerism suggests that the initial
motivations for volunteering are unrelated to the attributes of the
program that drive continued participation (Ryan et al. 2001,
Asah and Blahna 2013). The evolution of motivations reflects a
similar process of participation and engagement among PLC
landholders. Within the BSP the motivations that landholders
stated for initially enrolling in the program were often not the
same motivations that contributed to their overall program
satisfaction or that engendered long-term commitment to the
program. Landholders were motivated by their own conservation
goals to adopt the program; 98% of landholders expressed that
the impetus to participate in the BSP was to protect and properly
manage the landscape and protect the species on their land.
Enrollment for nearly 30% of participants was facilitated by a
land tax rate reduction, although it was clearly expressed that this
was not central to participating, just “a sweetener.” In contrast,
continued participation in the BSP was linked by 74% of
landholders to the efficacy of land management assistance and
training, the quality of the landholder’s relationship with the
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management agency, and the frequency of visits by a stewardship
officer. Of those responding negatively the landholders felt they
“had kept up their end of the bargain” but were neglected by the
BSP. These results are supported by previous BSP work
(Cumming 2007, Pasquini et al. 2010), conservation psychology
research into motivations (De Young 2000), and factors driving
satisfaction (Stroman and Kreuter 2015).  
Similarly, participants in the Greenfleet scheme were initially
drawn to the program by access to low-cost tree planting and
assistance in land restoration. Sometimes this linked to underlying
motivations, as one participant noted, “Our dream was always
not to farm the land but to plant it back up as bush.” However,
through interviews it became clear that motivation had shifted
with participation, and the partnership with Greenfleet staff  and
associated capacity building was an important component of
ongoing program satisfaction. Landholders’ capitalized on
Greenfleet’s regular monitoring of trees to engage foresters for
management guidance and support. Of the landholders in this
study, 94% emphasized the role of the extension officer (foresters)
in facilitating landholders’ access to information and linked this
continued engagement to the increased likelihood of long-term
sustained outcomes. As a landholder noted “It’s the knowledge
and the connections that Greenfleet have got that I don’t have to
worry about.”  
In the case of EcoTender, part of ongoing participant satisfaction
appeared to be linked not with the initial interaction with program
staff  or the securement of a covenant, but rather with other
participants. The desire for social networking opportunities
through EcoTender was notable, with 60% of EcoTender
participants wanting some form of engagement with other
landholders. However, because of the competitive design of the
auction bidding process, there was no formal way to interact with
one another. As has been noted with MBIs designed in this
fashion, the use of a competitive funding instrument can
constrain collaboration on land management between
landholders (Cooke and Moon 2015). As one participant noted,
“it would be great if  we did have...some sort of networking
opportunity. It would be nice to see how successful other
participants have been, whether they ran into problems... .” Being
able to discuss the program with fellow participants can help with
knowledge sharing and with advice on implementing the scheme
effectively (Riley 2006).  
There is a risk that management organizations can prioritize PLC
program outputs over long-term conservation outcomes that are
beyond the life of any given program (Wilson and Hart 2001).
The diversity and dynamism of landholder motivations and
satisfaction demands that financial incentives complement and
augment, other instruments such as capacity building,
stewardship officer visits, establishment of social networks, and
recognition of landholder efforts that support nonfinancial
motivations and engender long-term commitment. Financial
incentives facilitate a landholder’s intention by removing barriers
and providing opportunities for participation. However, effective
ongoing conservation management requires more than increasing
program participation or removing barriers to participation.  
Sustaining landholder involvement necessitates continued
behavioral reinforcement (Stern 2006). This can be achieved by
building collaborative partnerships between landholders and
conservation organizations (Wondolleck and Yaffee 2000, Cooke
et al. 2012), development of landholder networks, continued
visibility through auditing, and efforts toward comanagement
through land management assistance. For example, a
collaborative conservation ethic may mean rethinking the design
of MBIs like EcoTender, to enable formal landholder networks
than can extend beyond a conservation payment contract. This
collaborative process reinforces both landholders’ self-efficacy
(Bandura 1977) and proenvironmental social norms among
participating landholders (Knight et al. 2010).
3. Long-term stewardship is best supported by a diverse offering
of mechanisms
Our case studies highlight that the relationship between financial
incentives and on-ground conservation outcomes is likely to be
complex, and could be nonlinear, especially given the uncertainty
over ongoing management postcontract. There is little doubt that
financial incentives support transitions into PLC programs by
covering opportunity costs and investments, particularly for
landholders financially dependent on their land (Burns et al.
2016). However, we contend they are not suitable as the backbone
of a PLC strategy, particularly for organizations seeking long-
term outcomes. Indeed there are substantial risks in relying too
heavily on PLC programs that are designed with a financial
incentive as their centerpiece. Here we detail how a diverse offering
of mechanisms can best develop and enhance stewardship, in
particular stewardship extension support.  
The BSP illustrates a balanced mix of mechanisms that
successfully entices landholders by providing multiple pathways
into the program, and engages them in the long term with
continued stewardship support. The program can secure valued
nature across four tiers of increasing protection, supported by
increasing degrees of financial and management support, each
offering commitment options to match landholder needs.
Landholders enrolled in the BSP receive nonfinancial incentives
from government organizations including land management
advice, invasive plant species management support, and fire
management assistance delivered through an extension officer.
Landholder buy-in of these activities is compulsory, increasing
co-ownership of land restoration and materials, e.g., fencing or
herbicide. Landholder achievements are also recognized through
an annual landholder awards night, and signage designating the
land as part of the BSP. Landholders use the status of their
stewardship lands as a form of accreditation to market ecotourism
business and “green” products, e.g., wine, fruit, flowers. Increasing
landholder commitment through the BSP by increasing the term
and conditions of the contract is matched by an increasing
amount of support from the conservation authority.  
Lands with the highest conservation value and those with title-
deed restrictions of 30 years or higher receive property tax
exemption (Cumming et al. 2015). This indirect financial incentive
is intended to mitigate the effect of removing land from
agricultural status, which in South Africa is taxed at a lower rate
than that of conservation status. Audits of the participants are
conducted yearly, complementing the mix of incentives with an
enforcement instrument. The BSP generated a sense of
partnership by comanaging lands with landholders. Over a third
of BSP participants offered similar sentiments to the landholder
who expected “collaboration on joint projects [on the stewardship
land]...there is much we [the BSP and the landholder] can do
together.”  
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By providing a variety of mechanisms, i.e., tax incentive,
information, property-rights instrument, enforcement, accreditation,
and awards, the BSP achieves a standard that other programs in
both developing and developed countries could emulate to
increase uptake in a heterogeneous population of landholders and
maintain long-term stewardship among participants. During the
interviews the full range of instruments offered by BSP were
described as beneficial, but some such as land and invasive plant
management assistance came up more frequently with 63% of
participants remarking on their importance. As a landholder
remarked, “The benefits that I have enjoyed so far, funding [for
invasive clearing], technical assistance, managing, as well as labor
for clearing, have been invaluable to our farm.” Our analysis
demonstrated that stewardship extension officer support in
particular had an outsized influence on BSP satisfaction with 74%
of program landholders discussing the importance of interaction
with a stewardship officer. This is similar to findings from our
other case studies, which were not established with the intention
of providing landholders with support from a stewardship
officer.  
Of the surveyed EcoTender participants, 35% reported that the
site visit by an extension officer to assess their reverse auction
tender bid as one of the highlights of the program. Given the
paucity of extension opportunities available to landholders,
participants used this visit as a chance to ask important questions
about land management, species identification, and landscape
change. Knowledge-sharing and social interaction with an
extension officer or a social network of landholders can motivate
landholders to sustain long-term conservation efforts.
Additionally, landholders in the Greenfleet program stated that
having foresters visiting their properties to monitor carbon is an
important element of the program: “they [Greenfleet’s foresters]
know their stuff, they know when to plant, they’ve been
fantastic.”  
In both of the Australian examples, the advice and assistance
provided to landholders through property visits from extension
officers was important, but happened informally. Integrating
these opportunities for enhancing landholder knowledge and
capacity more formally as a program instrument may assist in the
continuation of land management practices after a program
concludes (EcoTender) or when property visits are infrequent
(Greenfleet). This is especially important when program
involvement presents new land management challenges that
participants have not previously encountered.
CONCLUSION
If  PLC programs are to deliver conservation benefits on private
land that are sustained and supported by landholders, the
instruments utilized need to be positioned within an overarching
strategy that recognizes a dynamic social-ecological context
(Gunningham and Young 1997). Financially incentivizing
enrolment can be a useful tool to draw landholders into a PLC
program, but landholders’ ongoing participation in programs is
driven by a variety of factors that are not necessarily related to
economic considerations (Selinske et al. 2015).  
Our case study results reinforce the need for flexible and diverse
approaches to conservation policy that emphasize a suite of policy
mechanisms. There is substantial evidence from our case studies
and existing research that financial incentives are not well suited
to being the foundation upon which PLC policy and programs
should be built. Policy makers need to be open to the ways in
which landholders’ “practical and emotional attachments”
(Trigger et al. 2010:1070) to their landscapes manifest through
their stewardship ethic and connect with, reinterpret, or resist
program objectives. Ideally, to secure conservation benefits on
private land, program design would consider what is required to
foster stewardship over the long term.  
We suggest that recognizing social-ecological complexity and
responding to the dynamism and uncertainty that this entails
(which makes the rigidity of some financial incentive programs
less attractive) needs to be considered upfront when designing
PLC policy. To enhance a landholder’s ability to respond to
change, we need cooperation and critical reflection among and
between the different actors in PLC program design and
implementation. Financial incentives that do not foster
collaboration and ongoing stewardship may be problematic in the
long-term, especially in the face of indefinite political support for
conservation initiatives. As we have argued, an approach to PLC
that centers on the context of implementation and responds to a
diverse range of landholder stewardship motivations benefits
both landholders and conservation organizations, enhancing the
potential for long-term ecological benefits.
Responses to this article can be read online at: 
http://www.ecologyandsociety.org/issues/responses.
php/9148
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